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The Influence of Risk on the Equity Share of Build-Operate-Transfer Projects 1 
 2 
1. Introduction  3 
In a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) delivery system, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 4 
designs, funds, builds, and operates a public infrastructure for a specified concession 5 
period at the end of which the facility is transferred back to the public authority (Malini, 6 
1999). Under a BOT contract, the required capital expenditure is typically financed with 7 
equity and debt sources of private funding, and sometimes also with an injection of a 8 
share of initial public funds. The capital structure is designed in order to satisfy both the 9 
investor’s expected return on investment and the lender’s cover ratios. To repay the 10 
investment and operational services, the SPV is typically allowed to collect the users’ 11 
fees or a shadow toll during the concession period. It is claimed that such a BOT scheme 12 
facilitates the development of capital projects by governments with funds from outside 13 
the public budget allocation, while transferring most of the risks to the private sector 14 
(Kang et al., 2011). 15 
One of the success factors of a BOT project is the design of an optimized capital structure 16 
that assures an adequate level of return on investment for the shareholders and sufficient 17 
debt capacity to reimburse the debt incurred (Zhang, 2005). A related key point is that 18 
risk factors play a crucial role in the definition of the capital structure because they affect 19 
both the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and the targets imposed on lenders’ 20 
covenants, such as the target Debt Service Coverage Ratios (DSCR). 21 
Several studies have actually investigated the association between risk factors and the 22 
capital structure, but little research has so far studied the possible effects of the most 23 
important sources of risk on the determination of the Equity Share (ES) of capital injected 24 
into a BOT initiative as an integrating and additional understanding of the standard 25 
practices used in capital structuring. 26 
With the aim of bridging this research gap, this paper presents an empirical analysis on 27 
the capital structure of an international sample of BOT projects so that several relevant 28 
risk factors that might have significant relationships with the ES are identified and 29 
analyzed. The sample includes 52 projects, financed by World Bank and mainly delivered 30 
in developing countries, to build and operate a variety of power and transportation 31 
infrastructures as well as social facilities. The effect of risk on the capital structure of 32 
BOT projects has been noted to be quite an important issue especially in developing 33 
countries, due to limited competition, inadequate skills in implementing and managing 34 
BOT long-term contracts, political instability, complex negotiation processes, and, in 35 
turn, expensive and limited capital markets (Kwak et al., 2009; Chen and Doloi, 2008; 36 
Chen, 2009; Yang et al., 2010).  37 
The results of the present study offer project stakeholders a better understanding of the 38 
risk factors that might facilitate higher debt leverages and help refine the capital structures 39 
of BOT projects. 40 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of current pertinent 41 
literature on capital structure of BOT projects, then in the research methodology the main 42 
risks related to the capital structure are identified, and the proposed risk model is given 43 
in order to establish the relationship with the equity investment. The project dataset and 44 
a Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) analysis are presented in Section 4, together with 45 
the empirical results. Section 5 provides the interpretation of the research results while 46 
Section 6 discusses the implications of the study in order to envisage potential 47 
applications for the establishment of an enhanced capital structure. Finally, the research 48 
conclusions are drawn up, recommendations are made, and future research directions are 49 
outlined. 50 
2. Pertinent Literature  51 
A BOT delivery system is a type of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in which a legal 52 
entity, often known as SPV or project company, is allowed, by a public granting authority 53 
to design, finance, build and operate a public infrastructure for a predetermined 54 
concession period, at the end of which ownership, operations and maintenance (O&M) 55 
duties are transferred back to the public institution (Malini, 1999; Kumaraswamy and 56 
Morris, 2002).  These contracts rely on the idea of partnership in which two or more 57 
stakeholders operate for their mutual benefits and improvements (Villalba-Romero and 58 
Liyanage, 2016). Revenues are obtained either from the end users or from a single offtake 59 
purchaser, such as a utility company or a government, that purchases the project output 60 
(World Bank, 2015), while the initial investment is privately financed with both equity 61 
and debt sources of funding. 62 
 BOT delivery systems have been recognized as an effective mechanism to mobilize 63 
private finance in public investments and to obtain value for money from the efficiencies 64 
of the private sector in managing public services and new technology (Bao et al., 2015). 65 
The BOT contract is widely used to develop a discrete asset and is generally entirely new 66 
or green field in nature (World Bank, 2015). Many projects in a broad range of sectors 67 
have been successfully developed using BOT, with significantly increased output value. 68 
These include roads, bridge, ports, airports, railways, power, water supply, waste systems, 69 
telecommunication, schools, prisons and hospitals (Gupta et al., 2013).This delivery 70 
system facilitates the development of capital-intensive infrastructure projects with funds 71 
coming from outside the public budget allocation field (Kang et al., 2011). Thus, the 72 
attractiveness of BOT initiatives stems from the opportunity of limiting government 73 
public spending by shifting investment costs to the private sector (Auriol and Picard, 74 
2013). 75 
Moreover, the BOT scheme underlines the benefits that can be obtained by transferring 76 
most of the project risks from the public to the private sector. Since a project consists of 77 
dealing with several risks, borne either by one or both parties (De Marco and Mangano, 78 
2013), BOT and other similar types of PPP schemes require a proper and careful risk 79 
analysis and risk allocation between the public authority and the SPV (Zou et al., 2014). 80 
This analysis is usually deemed more complex than in traditional construction contracts 81 
(Pellegrino et al., 2013). In other words, risk is an important component in determining 82 
the most appropriate levels of equity and debt sources necessary to finance project 83 
investment. In fact, the amount of debt the project can raise is a function of the expected 84 
capacity of its cash flows to service debt obligations and its creditworthiness, which 85 
depends on such aspects as the inherent value of its assets, its expected profitability, the 86 
amount of risk borne by the SPV, and the risk profile of the projected cash flows 87 
(Finnerty, 2013). 88 
Also, risk factors affect the cost of capital and, in turn via the debt leverage, the WACC, 89 
which is a key determinant of investment decision by the project company’s shareholders. 90 
However, since lenders raise the equity amount in an attempt to protect against risk 91 
exposure, targets imposed by the lending institutions on DSCRs are increased due to risk 92 
factors and, consequently, the debt capacity is reduced. This usually conflicts with the 93 
need of investors to minimize the equity level (Yun et al., 2009; Chang and Chen, 2001). 94 
Therefore, the determination of an appropriate debt-to-equity ratio is difficult because the 95 
capital structure of a BOT project varies according to the risk borne by the equity sponsors 96 
and the debt lenders. On the one hand, in order to obtain an attractive Rate of Return to 97 
Equity (RRE) through a minimized equity investment and the associated risk, equity 98 
holders usually seek to maximize the debt leverage as much as the project cash flow can 99 
justify. On the other hand, the lending institutions tend to size the debt level on the basis 100 
of the estimated risk profile of the project: the greater the risk, the lower the debt amount. 101 
As a consequence, it is crucial for both lenders and SPV shareholders to define an 102 
appropriate capital structure that is able to optimize the capital structure. Therefore, a 103 
successful PF initiative is based on an evaluation of all risks that a project faces during 104 
its life cycle (Nikolìc et al., 2011). 105 
To this end, some previous studies attempted to investigate the relationship between risks 106 
and capital structure (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005; Zhang, 2005; Jin, 2010), but little 107 
research has been conducted to study the effects of risk on the level of equity of BOT 108 
initiatives. As a consequence, the relationship between the risk and the equity contribution 109 
in BOT projects is still unexplored and questions have arisen among practitioners and 110 
scholars regarding how to balance the proper level of equity.   111 
3. Methodology and Model 112 
3.1. Methodology design 113 
The research was conducted through the following steps. First, after conducting a 114 
literature analysis, the main risk factors that were deemed to influence the equity 115 
participation in BOT initiatives were identified. To this end, each risk source was listed 116 
together with a proxy indicator, which was measured by a parameter. Second, data were 117 
collected from public web sources and an exploratory data analysis was carried out. 118 
Finally, after assuming that the ES was the response variable and the risk parameters were 119 
the independent factors, a MLR analysis was conducted using the MiniTab® software 120 
package in order to capture the relationship between the risk profile of the project and its 121 
capital structure. 122 
As suggested by the literature review on research in BOT projects, many studies with 123 
different methodologies contributed to the field. However, as revealed by comparative 124 
studies (Kwak et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2010), no study has attempted to apply the MLR 125 
approach to determine the crucial influence of various risks on the ES of BOT projects. 126 
The appropriateness of the MLR lies in its ability to test the existing impact of 127 
independent variables (the BOT risk factors) on the dependent variable (the ES). To 128 
understand such influence, the MLR proves to be a superior and reliable method (De 129 
Marco et al., 2012a). Moreover, the MLR quantifies the strength of relationship between 130 
a dependent variable and independent variables (Tukey 1977). In this respect, the MLR 131 
methodology is more appropriate and reliable compared to other methodologies (e.g., 132 
case method, factor analysis, or questionnaire survey) described in Tang et al. (2010). 133 
3.2. The BOT risk model 134 
Table 1 reports a classification of the risk sources with the associated indicators and 135 
parameters that are likely to affect the ES in BOT projects. The identification of risks is 136 
usually considered as the first step in managing BOT projects properly. All the risks were 137 
grouped into areas of origin, namely: Country, Financial, Revenue, Project and SPV-138 
related risks. Each category of risk is identified with reference to literature studies. The 139 
country and the financial risks are related to the political risk; the revenue risks refers to 140 
the market areas; the project risks are inherent to the construction and the operations of 141 
the initiative, and finally SPV risks are associated with concessionaire risks.     142 
Insert Table 1 143 
3.2.1. Country risk 144 
The country risks come from the context of political events and government policies that 145 
could influence the profitability of a project, affect approval processes and execution 146 
delays (Song et al., 2013), and create barriers to the development of the project (Janssen 147 
et al., 2016). These kinds of risk are associated with governmental corruption 148 
(Maslyukivska and Sohail, 2007) and poor governmental decision-making processes (Li 149 
et al., 2005). Country risk was here described by means of two indicators, namely Country 150 
Attractiveness and Political Environments. Country Attractiveness refers to the capability 151 
of a country to attract private capital for investments and is measured via Government 152 
Effectiveness (GE) and Regulatory Quality (RQ) indices (i.e., parameters in the proposed 153 
BOT risk model). GE indicates the perception of the quality of public services and the 154 
quality of policy implantation, while RQ refers to the ability of a government to formulate 155 
regulations that promote private sector development (World Bank, 2013). GE and RQ 156 
both range from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 indicating high quality. 157 
The political environment was measured by means of the Political Stability (PS) index, 158 
which has the aim of capturing the perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 159 
and political violence (World Bank, 2013). PS ranges from -2.5, which indicates 160 
scarce/poor quality, to +2.5, which indicates high quality. This indicator is very important 161 
since it can be associated with the public authority’s role to create the necessary 162 
conditions for the establishment of a collaborative environment (Badi and Pryke 2015) 163 
The parameters associated with the country risk were expected to have a negative impact 164 
on the ES, in the sense that low risk environments invite/encourage the lending institution 165 
to maximize the debt leverage, and the equity contribution can thus decrease.   166 
3.2.2. Financial Risk 167 
Financial risks appear to be crucial since they may have a heavy impact on a project’s 168 
cash flows and in turn affect its profitability (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). One of the 169 
main elements associated with financial risk is the inflation rate (Estache at al., 2007), 170 
since it can negatively influence the purchasing power and the return on investment. The 171 
higher the inflation, the more the/a project costs. Consequently, equity participation tends 172 
to decrease. Inflation is measured through the inflation rate (INFL), paying regard to 173 
historical monthly values, as reported by Rateinflation (2013). 174 
Another key factor related to financial risk is the cost of equity capital, which is associated 175 
with the amount of debt and the internal rate of return (Schaufelberger and Widapasut, 176 
2003) and, in turn, with the feasibility of a project (Ling and Lim, 2007). This indicator 177 
can be estimated by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model, considering that the return on 178 
equity is related to the firms’ equity Beta. For this reason, the parameter selected as a 179 
proxy of the cost of equity is the Beta of Partners (BETA_PART) (Bloomberg, 2014). A 180 
low BETA_PART parameter stands for low risks and low expected returns. On the 181 
contrary, high betas indicate high risks and high associated returns. This could make 182 
lending institutions unwilling to provide bulk debt services in such situations, so that 183 
higher equity shares are required. 184 
3.2.3. Revenue Risk 185 
Revenue risk is associated with the commercial success of a BOT project and the potential 186 
changes on the revenue streams that may have an impact on the project cash flow (Sing 187 
and Kalidindi, 2006). The cash flows are typically used by private investors to evaluate 188 
projects (Olson et al., 2010). An example of revenue risk is the traffic risk in pay-toll road 189 
projects. Revenue risk largely depends on the economic environment, wherein a project 190 
is developed as an indicator of the ability of the end users, or offtake purchasers, to pay 191 
for the BOT project services. This indicator is measured via the GDP Growth Rate (GDP) 192 
in order to represent either positive or negative commercial spending environments. A 193 
high level of GDP Growth Rate stands for a less risky environment so that, in turn, the 194 
level of requested ES of the investment can be reduced. 195 
3.2.4. Project Risk 196 
Project risk can refer to development risks that may cause schedule delays and cost 197 
overruns, such as design and construction risks. Development risks generally increase 198 
with the size of the project investment, due to the number of involved stakeholders, 199 
execution tasks, coordination actions, and communications. Investment Size (INV) is the 200 
parameter that was used here to measure the project size. 201 
In addition, project risks are related to complexity, in terms of construction site 202 
conditions, sophisticated design, the use of new construction technologies, etc. Therefore, 203 
it may be assumed that a long construction duration is a crucial aspect in a complex project 204 
(Hoffmann et al., 2007). For this reason, the Construction Duration (CDUR) parameter, 205 
expressed in years, was used here to represent project complexity. 206 
Project risk is also related to the project’s capability to generate a sufficient cash flow in 207 
order to repay the debt and ensure acceptable levels of profit. In the proposed model, the 208 
capability of creating this cash flow stream was measured by the Concession Period 209 
(CPER), defined as the length of the contract, expressed in years during which an SPV 210 
operates the project on behalf of the public party. This parameter is mainly related to the 211 
recovery of the investment. A long duration of concessions can bring much uncertainty 212 
to the BOT project (Sarmento and Rennegoo, 2016), but a longer concession period is 213 
more beneficial for the private investor, who can benefit from more profits (Carbonara et 214 
al., 2014). The size of investment requested for a project is likely to call for greater 215 
apportionment of equity, in terms of total amount, but smaller in percent share because 216 
of the higher financial exposure. On the contrary, a long construction duration makes a 217 
project riskier, and lending institution are less willing to fund the debt portion of project 218 
finance. Thus, the SPV partners have to collect higher ES into the project investment 219 
(Logan, 2003). Finally, longer concession periods offer the opportunity of collecting 220 
money over a longer period of time. This entails a lower risk and, in turn, a lower level 221 
of ES is required.   222 
3.2.5. SPV Risk 223 
Finally, SPV related risks were described by the Solidity indicator, which refers to the 224 
financial strength of the consortium of partners of the SPV. It may be viewed as a measure 225 
of the durability of the concessionaire as an independent entity to raise fund, repay debt 226 
and make profit.  Even though the SPV is supposed to be independent, its financial 227 
solidity is strongly related to the financial reliability of the partners (Parikh and Samson, 228 
1999). Therefore, we may assume a significant relation between the financial Solidity of 229 
the SPV and the financial strategy for developing a project (Dixon et al., 2005).  The 230 
Solidity of the SPV is measured by the Average Size of Partners (PART_SIZE) 231 
parameter, which is defined as the average weighted value of the market capitalization of 232 
the main shareholders (De Marco et al, 2012a). Since it is easier to raise funds for a project 233 
for a more solid SPV, the associated level of risk decreases, and high debt leverages are 234 
acceptable because they are more likely to be reimbursed. This reflects on smaller shares 235 
of the equity contribution. 236 
4. Project dataset and results 237 
4.1. Dataset  238 
Table 2, which refers to the proposed risk model, summarizes information on the dataset 239 
by presenting the independent risk parameters that are deemed significant in the 240 
determination of the ES of BOT initiatives. The columns report the minimum, mean, and 241 
maximum values, the low, average and upper quartiles, and the standard deviations, 242 
respectively. 243 
Insert Table 2 244 
The sample is composed of 52 BOT projects that have been selected from different areas 245 
around the world, and are especially related to energy initiatives. The initiatives show an 246 
approximate $490 MLN average investment and their ES ranges from 17% to 51% of the 247 
total capital expenditure while the financial close goes from 1995 up to 2013   248 
4.2. Regression analysis and results 249 
The goal of the regression analysis is to test whether the independent variables taken into 250 
account are significant factors and whether they have a positive or negative impact on the 251 
response variable (Newbold et al., 2013; Tabanick and Fidell, 2001). A positive influence 252 
indicates that an increase (or decrease) in the independent variable determines an increase 253 
(or decrease) in the dependent variable, while a negative effect produces an opposite 254 
result between independent and response variable variations. 255 
To achieve this goal, first, the presence of multicollinearity among the independent 256 
variables was investigated via the calculation of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The 257 
VIF evaluates the relationship between an independent variable and all the other 258 
independent ones within the model, and it is calculated as 1/(1-R2), where R2 is the 259 
coefficient of determination of one predictor on all the others; it represents the proportion 260 
of variance in the independent variables under study that is associated with the other 261 
independent variables in the model. Variables with a VIF greater than 5 are subject to 262 
exclusion from the model (Tabanick and Fidell, 2001), as this would lead to erratic 263 
estimation of the regression coefficient (O’Brien, 2007). Table 3 shows that there was no 264 
multicollinearity in the risk model. 265 
Insert Table 3 266 
Secondly, after checking for multicollinearity, the study carried out the standardization 267 
of the values of risk parameters (Carrol Rovezzi and Carroll, 2002). This was needed due 268 
to the fact that the variables in the dataset had different orders of magnitude and 269 
measurement, so it was difficult to compare them with regard to the level of significance 270 
they had on the value of the ES. In order to generalize the results obtained from the test 271 
on the dataset of the 52 projects, it was deemed worthwhile to provide the following 272 
considerations. Given the size of the dataset, the paper carried out the observations of 273 
each parameter normally distributed with its respective mean and variance values. 274 
Moreover, the values of the population mean and variance of each risk parameter were 275 
unknown. To this end, the mean and standard error of each risk parameter were calculated 276 
and each observation was then standardized using the Student’s t-test with Eq.(1). Finally, 277 
the proposed risk model was given in the form of a MLR, as in Eq.(2).  278 
 279 
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where x  is the sample mean of the value of a risk parameter; 284 
μ is the population mean of the value of a risk parameter; 285 
nS /  is the standard error – ratio of the sample standard deviation to the square root of 286 
the sample size of 52 projects; 287 
Y is the level of the equity 288 
α is the estimate of the constant coefficient;  289 
β is the estimate of the parameter coefficient; 290 
x is the value of a risk parameter; 291 
k is the number of risk parameters, which here is 10.  292 
The standardization results are set out in Table 4, in which the columns show the estimate 293 
of the parameter coefficient, the standard error, the value of the t-statistic and the p-value 294 
along with the associated level of significance.  295 
Insert Table 4 296 
Thus, the regression model is given in Eq.(3): 297 
 298 
Equity share = 0.367 – 0.0072Government Effectiveness – 0.061Regulatory Quality + 299 
0.191Political Stability – 0.139Inflation Rate – 0.096Average Beta of Partners + 300 
0.260GDP Growth Rate – 0.383 Investment Size + 0.394Construction Duration + 0.150 301 
Concession Period + 0.327Average Size of Partners    (3) 302 
 303 
As far as the statistical background of the results given in Table 4 is concerned, it is 304 
worthwhile mentioning the following. The p-value, which ranges from 0 to 1, is obtained 305 
from the observed sample and represents the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 306 
given below. The p-value of each risk parameter tests the null hypothesis that the estimate 307 
of the regression coefficient is equal to zero. This implies that, in the proposed risk model, 308 
the null hypothesis (H0) represents “no influence” of a risk parameter on the ES, while 309 
the alternative hypothesis (H1) implies that there is such an influence at a given 310 
significance level.  311 
H0: There is no significant influence (positive or negative) of a risk parameter on the level 312 
of equity. 313 
 H1: There is significant influence (positive or negative) of a risk parameter on the level 314 
of equity. 315 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the risk parameters can either positively or negatively impact 316 
on the ES, and this impact is represented by the estimate of the regression coefficient with 317 
its appropriate sign. The significance level, which is equal to the probability of either 0.05 318 
or 0.01, represents a constant critical value at either 5% or 1%, respectively. If the p-value 319 
is smaller than the given critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected and it can be 320 
concluded that there is a significant relationship between a risk parameter and the ES at 321 
a given significant level. On the contrary, if the p-value is more than the predetermined 322 
critical value, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, the result of which is that there is 323 
not enough evidence to prove the existence of a significant relationship between the 324 
independent and dependent variables. In other words, under the null hypothesis, the test 325 
implies that the estimate of the regression coefficient is equal to zero, so the t-value is 326 
therefore brought to zero and the p-value to 1 (Newbold et al., 2013). This means that the 327 
risk parameters under consideration have no influence on the ES with a probability of 328 
100% (the p-value of 1). The explanatory power of the model is measured by the multiple 329 
R-squared and the adjusted R-squared coefficients, which show the portion of the total 330 
variation in the dependent variable that is explained by variation in the independent 331 
variables (Newbold et al., 2013; Tabanick and Fidell, 2001). A multiple R-squared value 332 
of 50.50% implies the portion of the variation in the level of equity due to the variation 333 
in all of the risk parameters taken together. 334 
However, from a practical point of view, it was worth considering the adjusted R-squared 335 
value as it is/was an unbiased estimate of the portion of the total variation in the ES, which 336 
takes/took into account the sample size of 52 projects and all the variables in the 337 
constructed risk model. An appropriate R-squared value depends on the application field, 338 
and the values derived from the present research are acceptable for the management field 339 
and in a decisional context (Newbold et al., 2013; Tabanick and Fidell, 2001). 340 
As far as practical considerations of the results are concerned, after comparing the p-341 
values of different risk parameters against the two given levels of significance in the 342 
regression test, the following was found: GE and INV had a negative impact on the level 343 
of equity, which means that more attractive business environments and huge initiatives 344 
require less equity participation. On the contrary, high rates of GDP, longer CDUR, and 345 
larger SPVs call for higher levels of ES. In terms of level of magnitude, CDUR, INV, and 346 
SIZE_PART impact more heavily on the ES, since the absolute values of their 347 
coefficients are the greatest ones. On the contrary, the influence of GE is lighter, with an 348 
absolute value of its coefficient equal to 0.072.  349 
Finally, Fig. (2) presents the test results on the data residuals used to validate the 350 
consistency of the proposed model. The Normal probability plot shows that the residuals 351 
are normally distributed, and they follow a straight line without the existence of non-352 
normality, skewness, or outliers in the project dataset. The Residuals versus fits indicate 353 
that there is no evidence of a systematic error in the residuals of the regression model and 354 
that they are randomly scattered around zero. The Histogram of the residuals resembles a 355 
normal curve, thus demonstrating normality of the dataset. Moreover, while the Residuals 356 
versus orders do not present any systematic trends caused by periodicity, the residuals 357 
correlate with one another or with the time series. 358 
Insert Fig.1 359 
5. Interpretation of the results 360 
The results show that five out of the ten examined risk factors have a significant statistical 361 
relevance on describing equity participation in the capital structure of BOT projects, and 362 
the relevant drivers confirm the pre-assumed relationships. Thus, risks in different aspects 363 
are important factors to be considered by project stakeholders (Ng et al., 2012) when 364 
assessing a BOT project and designing its capital structure.  365 
In particular, the negative impact of GE demonstrates that low-risk countries are able to 366 
create an environment that facilitates the collection of higher debts in the capital structure 367 
of BOT projects, while, accordingly, private sponsors are called upon to contribute with 368 
less equity funding. Furthermore, a well-structured regulation framework at the country 369 
level can increase the willingness of private investors to participate in public 370 
infrastructure development efforts. 371 
At the same time, the positive relationship with GDP growth shows that a low level of 372 
risk, associated with a higher capability of a project to generate revenue, is more likely to 373 
attract more equity funding. In fact, the rate of return is generally higher for equity capital 374 
than for debt, and this higher cash flow needs to be covered from sufficient streams of 375 
revenue. Coherently, the revenue risk has been identified as one of the most critical risk 376 
factors to have an impact on the success of a BOT initiative (Singh and Kalidindi, 2006), 377 
although sponsors rely not only on the balance sheet, but also on the revenue stream to 378 
finance a project. 379 
The negative influence of the size of the investment underlines that a large project 380 
imposes a greater financial effort on project sponsors, who provide more equity to the 381 
total amount, but less in percent share. This aspect is related to the fact that as the size of 382 
a project increases, the inherent risk also increases due to high start-up costs, long-term 383 
investment time spans, slow rates of return and high degrees of asset specificity (Wibowo 384 
and Alfen, 2013). Moreover, construction projects often involve many contracting parties 385 
and one-of-a-kind development efforts (Halawa et al., 2013). The positive influence of 386 
the construction duration means that long construction periods are related to high risks of 387 
delay and cost overrun. Therefore, lending institutions are hesitant to contribute with 388 
more debt leverage to the capital structure of a project. This higher level of risk is 389 
associated with an increased level of uncertainty and complexity related to larger projects 390 
with long construction durations (Rafindadi et al., 2014). 391 
Similarly, the positive impact of the average size of partners on the ES confirms the idea 392 
that a greater financial solidity allows more equity to be injected into the initial investment 393 
of a project. This specific aspect is becoming more and more important, because lending 394 
institutions are asking private investors for strong balance sheets before undertaking an 395 
investment, and this is creating entry barriers for small contractors, with a negative effect 396 
on the level of competition (Demirag et al., 2011). 397 
6. Implications 398 
The proposed model addresses both theoretical and practical implications. 399 
From a theoretical point of view, the results obtained from the regression analysis 400 
conducted lead to a better understanding of the risk factors that influence the capital 401 
structure of BOT projects, so they have been proposed as a foundation to establish 402 
improved methods in order to design refined capital structures in BOT projects. 403 
As far the practical implications are concerned, the study carried out could help get a 404 
better understanding of the main factors that influence the ES of BOT investments, which 405 
thing in turn provides opportunities for private promoters to enhance the profitability 406 
associated with equity capital, and for lending agencies that fund international projects to 407 
better deal with risks related to the debts they grant. 408 
In a BOT initiative, the lending institutions usually ask for a greater ES as proof of 409 
commitment of the project promoters, in order also to reduce the risk associated with the 410 
debt service burden on the project cash flow (Walker, and Smith 1995). On the contrary, 411 
project promoters have the aim of maximizing debt leverage in order to relieve the 412 
associated private risk and assure an acceptable and attractive rate of return. This model 413 
may be viewed as a support for private investors to achieve a more efficient level of equity 414 
in their BOT investments, and it could assist both shareholders and lenders to attain a 415 
more balanced risk allocation and a more efficient capital structure of BOT projects. 416 
Moreover, this study may help international project sponsors and investors get a better 417 
understanding of the project conditions and regional environments that could facilitate 418 
high debt leverages and low equity contributions, with improved effects on the project 419 
selection and project portfolio management processes. Accordingly, future research will 420 
have to address translating the model put forward into a practical project assessment 421 
framework in order to assist sponsors and lending institutions in the process of 422 
determining a more accurate project risk rate, with a resultant improved design of the 423 
capital structure. 424 
7. Summary 425 
This study has been conducted to understand the way risks are related to the capital 426 
structure of a BOT project and to help design an efficient debt-to-equity ratio. In 427 
particular, hypothesizing that equity participation is affected by project risks, a model and 428 
its associated empirical analysis have been proposed with the aim of understanding the 429 
risk factors that could have an impact on the ES of a BOT initiative. Country, Financial, 430 
Revenue, Project and SPV-related risks have been defined, together with their indicators 431 
and associated parameters. The results show that four out of the five identified sources of 432 
risk have a significant influence on the equity portion of financing injected into a BOT 433 
project, namely: Country risk, connected to the efficiency of public services, Revenue 434 
risk, measured by the growth of the GDP rate of the region in which the project is 435 
developed, Project risk, in terms of the amount of total investment and the duration of the 436 
construction period, and the SPV-related risk, linked to the financial solidity of the 437 
partners involved in the project company.  438 
The regression analysis has highlighted that government effectiveness, the rate of GDP 439 
growth, the size of investment, the construction duration, and the average financial size 440 
of the SPV partners have a significant impact on the percent share of equity that private 441 
sponsors inject as their initial financing /funds into a project.  The proposed methodology 442 
leads to a better understanding of the main factors that affect the amount of equity injected 443 
into a BOT initiative. 444 
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Project Name Country 
Year of 
Financial 
Close 
Equity 
Share 
Goverment 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Political 
Stability 
Constr. 
Duration 
Conc. 
Period 
Inv. 
Size 
Beta of 
Partners 
Avg. Size 
of 
Partners 
Inflation 
Rate 
GDP 
Growth 
Sual Pangasinan Coal-
Fired Power Plant 
Philippines 1995 0.23 -0.18 0.26 -0.48 3 25 1350 0.8244 12,500 0.067 0.047 
PT Energi Sengkang Indonesia 1996 0.20 -0.42 0.19 -1.18 4 20 225 1.83 665 0.08 0.076 
Zhangzhou Houshi 
Power Plant 
China 1999 0.20 -0.27 -0.33 -0.27 3 23 3200 1 5,450 -0.014 0.078 
Ilijan Power Plant 
(Kepco Ilijan 
Corporation) 
Philippines 2000 0.28 -0.14 0.16 -1.41 3.25 20 710 1.18 26,680 0.04 0.044 
Bangalore International 
Airport Limited 
India 2005 0.25 -0.08 -0.24 -0.99 2.7 30 324 1.7 338 0.042 0.093 
Nam Chien 2 
Hydropower Plant 
Vietnam 2007 0.43 -0.22 -0.53 0.21 4 20 33.5 0.8 9,980 0.083 0.071 
Yazd Solar/CCNG 
Plant 
Iran 2007 0.43 -1.59 -1.59 -0.99 2.5 35 158 0.75 2,600 0.172 0.078 
Magtaa Desalination 
Plant 
Algeria 2009 0.30 -0.58 -1.07 -1.22 2.5 25 468 1.1 6,000 0.057 0.016 
Suoi Lum 1 
Hydropower Plant 
Vietnam 2010 0.27 -0.25 0.17 0.24 1.7 20 22.7 1.3 980 0.071 0.054 
Thuong Kon Tum 
Hydropower Plant 
Vietnam 2010 0.30 -0.26 -0.62 0.11 2.7 30 267 0.32 1,200 0.089 0.064 
Cirebon Coal-fired 
Power Plant 
Indonesia 2010 0.32 -0.2 -0.39 -0.85 4 30 877 1.69 343 0.051 0.062 
Bao Loc Hydropower 
Plant 
Vietnam 2010 0.30 -0.26 -0.62 0.11 3 30 31.3 0.32 2,366 0.089 0.064 
Vinh Son 3 
Hydropower Plant 
Vietnam 2010 0.30 -0.26 -0.62 0.11 3 30 41.6 1.12 2,500 0.089 0.064 
Chu Linh and Coc San 
Hydropower Plants 
Vietnam 2010 0.25 -0.86 -0.74 -1.6 3 35 38.6 1.32 7,350 0.093 0.048 
Sanima Mai 
Hydropower Project 
(MHP) 
Nepal 2010 0.30 -0.01 -0.33 -1.29 2.5 29 163 1 4,750 0.089 0.066 
Bhubaneswar 
Expressways Private 
Limited 
India 2011 0.23 0.31 0.29 -0.68 2.5 25 420 1.105 19,040 0.034 0.04 
Norte II Combined 
Cycle Power Plant 
Mexico 2011 0.30 0.36 0.38 -0.95 6 34 260 0.6953 4,000 0.065 0.088 
Enerjisa Kavsakbendi 
HPP 
Turkey 2011 0.32 0.36 0.38 -0.95 4 30 1350 0.96 9,700 0.065 0.088 
Enerjisa Tufanbeyli 
Coal Plant 
Turkey 2011 0.30 -0.64 -0.42 0.47 3 25 230 1.32 4,000 0.064 0.068 
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TATA Itezhi-Tezhi 
HPP 
Zambia 2011 0.23 -0.01 -0.33 -1.29 3 35 3640 1.63 25,035 0.089 0.066 
L&T Hyderabad Metro 
Rail Private Limited 
India 2011 0.27 -0.01 -0.33 -1.29 3 30 371 1.35 6,700 0.089 0.066 
Navayuga Jahnavi Toll 
Bridge Private Limited 
India 2011 0.29 0.55 0.65 -0.66 4 40 157 0.95 15,000 0.085 0.07 
Darenhes Tatar HPP Turkey 2011 0.31 0.36 0.38 -0.95 4.3 45 300 0.8 6,400 0.065 0.088 
Blue Water Iron Ore 
Terminal Private 
Limited 
India 2011 0.28 -0.01 -0.33 -1.29 3 30 119 1.81 2,868 0.089 0.066 
SEW Bichom HPP India 2011 0.30 -0.01 -0.33 -1.29 4 35 194 0.4988 107 0.089 0.066 
Concepcion-Cabrero 
highway 
Chile 2011 0.28 1.26 1.48 0.46 4 35 375 1.71 2,900 0.033 0.058 
Greenko Dikchu HPP India 2011 0.30 -0.01 -0.33 -1.29 4.5 35 159 0.5364 264 0.089 0.066 
Song Bac HPP Vietnam 2011 0.22 -0.23 -0.59 0.17 2 20 64 1.7 3,750 0.187 0.062 
Nareva El 
Oued/Haouma/Akfhenir 
Wind Farm 
Morocco 2011 0.25 -0.13 -0.11 -0.39 2 20 343 1.3 7,800 0.009 0.05 
Santo Domingo de los 
Olleros TPP (Phase I) 
Peru 2011 0.35 -0.15 0.48 -0.74 1.5 40 128 0.83 1,700 0.034 0.065 
KOMIPO Wampu 
SHPP 
Indonesia 2012 0.25 -0.29 0.17 -0.57 3 30 174 0.6 4,130 0.043 0.063 
Green Ventures Likhu 
IV HPP 
Nepal 2012 0.34 -0.99 0.17 -1.38 4.5 40 263 1.3 650 0.095 0.049 
SAEMS Nyamwamba 
SHPP 
Uganda 2012 0.33 -0.57 0.17 -0.89 2 20 36 0.6953 4,000 0.14 0.067 
Bhopal Dhule 
Transmission Company 
Limited 
India 2012 0.25 -0.18 0.17 -1.25 3 35 320 2.32 4,400 0.093 0.047 
Jabalpur Transmission 
Company Limited 
India 2012 0.25 -0.18 0.17 -1.25 3 35 219 2.32 4,400 0.093 0.047 
ACP Tollways Private 
Limited 
India 2012 0.18 -0.18 0.17 -1.25 1.2 20 352 1.87 135 0.093 0.047 
Bali Nusa Dua Benoa 
Toll Road 
Indonesia 2012 0.30 -0.29 0.17 -0.57 1.2 50 264 0.7977 3,686 0.043 0.063 
Maharashtra Eastern 
Grid Power 
Transmission Com 
LTD 
India 2012 0.30 -0.18 0.17 -1.25 3 35 882 1.58 9,300 0.093 0.047 
Ruta 5 Norte/La 
Serena-Vallenar 
Chile 2012 0.23 1.25 0.18 0.35 1.5 35 439 1.71 2,900 0.03 0.054 
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Hangzhou Metro Line 
One 
China 2012 0.51 -0.54 0.17 -0.54 5 25 720 0.59 23,938 0.027 0.077 
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Bosphorus (Eurasia) 
Tunnel 
Turkey 2012 0.22 0.4 0.16 -1.19 5.5 30 1238 0.8 3,195 0.089 0.021 
Santo Antonio do Jari 
Hydro Power Plant 
Brazil 2012 0.26 0.007 0.17 0.07 3 57 512 0.81 4,304 0.054 0.01 
Western UP Power 
Transmission Company 
Limited 
India 2012 0.25 -0.18 0.17 -1.25 3.5 35 941 0.6242 5,300 0.093 0.047 
K-Water Star Patrind 
HPP 
Pakistan 2012 0.25 -0.79 0.17 -2.5 3.5 30 436 1 5,000 0.097 0.04 
Sao Goncalo do 
Amarante Airport 
Brazil 2012 0.18 -0.12 0.17 0.07 3 28 205 1.92 1,500 0.054 0.01 
Alto Jahuel 
Transmisora de Energia 
Chile 2013 0.17 1.25 0.18 0.35 2.5 35 249 0.2037 919 0.018 0.041 
Dirang Energy Private 
Limited - Gongri HEP 
India 2013 0.34 -0.18 0.17 -1.25 4 40 230 1.87 134 0.109 0.05 
Cilacap Power Plant 
Phase II 
Indonesia 2013 0.22 -0.29 0.17 -0.57 2.5 30 900 1.8 11,500 0.064 0.058 
Empresa de Generacion 
Electrica de Junin 
Peru 2013 0.30 -0.16 0.17 -0.86 2.5 20 89 0.5 347 0.028 0.058 
Neusberg Hydro 
Electric Plant 
South 
Africa 
2013 0.24 0.33 0.17 0 1.75 20 56 0.91 5,200 0.057 0.019 
Palmillas-Apaseo El 
Grande toll road 
Mexico 2013 0.32 0.32 0.17 -0.67 5 30 741 1.74 990 0.038 0.011 
Kalpataru Satpura 
Transco Private Limited 
India 2013 0.21 -0.18 0.17 -1.25 3 35 58.2 1 180 0.109 0.05 
